James A. Schmitz (2005) documents, in a well-known case study, a dramatic rise in productivity in the U.S. and Canadian iron-ore industry following an increase in competition from Brazil. Prior to the increased competition, the industry was not competitive. Surplus in pro…ts was divided between business and unions. Schmitz attributes the increase in productivity to a change in work practices in the industry, as old negotiated union work rules were abandoned or modi…ed. This research formalizes a mechanism through which a rise in competition can lead to increased productivity in the iron-ore industry.
Introduction
In a thought-provoking case study, James A. Schmitz documents how an increase in competition in the U.S. and Canadian Iron-Ore Industries, due to the entrance of Brazilian ore, led to large increases in productivity. The story is striking. Over the course of a few years, increased competition caused prices in the iron-ore industry to fall by 55%. While output initially fell by some 30%, it quickly returned to 92% of it's pre-crisis level. Real wages fell by 7%, but by 25% relative to pre-crisis trend. Simultaneously, labor productivity rose that arises from the fact that unionized wages are higher than non-unionized ones. Unions may have a deleterious impact on productivity. There is now a growing literature on the connection between productivity and competition. Holmes and Schmitz (2010) survey the literature on case studies concerning the impact of competition on productivity in particular industries, and discuss mechanisms by which competition a¤ects productivity. One paper that looks at the macroeconomic e¤ects of competition on productivity is Cole and Ohanian (2004) . They show how the National Industrial Recovery Act led to a symbiotic relationship arising between …rms and unions. Pro…ts and wages in some industry soared, despite the fact that the economy at large was su¤ering through the Great Depression. Cole, Ohanian, Riascos, and Schmitz (2005) study Latin America, and provide evidence that anticompetitive policies, rather than di¤erences in human capital or other factors, are the main reasons for low productivity in Latin American countries. Parente and Prescott (1999) argue that monopoly practices might be a barrier to development in poor countries.
They note that in rich countries, say Canada, unions might be constrained by competition from other countries, such as the U.S. Unions played an important role in the decline of manufacturing in the U.S. Rust Belt, according to Alder, Lagakos, and Ohanian (2013).
Last, Dinlersoz, Greenwood and Hyatt (2014) present evidence suggesting the unions target young and pro…table …rms in certi…cation elections, suggesting indeed that unions target …rms with extractable surplus, as assumed in this paper.
The Model
Consider an industry where there is a monopolistic …rm and a single union. All workers in the …rm are identical and are unions members. Decisions are the outcomes of negotiations between the …rm and the union.
The Firm
The …rm produces gross output using a constant-returns-to-scale technology that employs capital, labor, and materials. In particular, the production process is described by y = zl m k Here y is gross output, k denotes the stock of capital, l represents the services of labor, m and f represent the inputs of materials, and z stands for TFP. Observe that the …rst type of material input, m, is allowed substitute in standard fashion with other inputs in response to changes in prices. For example, when labor is expensive, the …rm might use better materials and supplies in order to cut back on the workers used in maintenance and repairs. The second type of materials, f , represents the …xed amount of some resources that simply must be used to create a certain amount of output. Bentonite and the lumber used for shafting might be such examples. Bentonite is used as a binder for creating iron ore pellets from the processed iron ore that derives from …nely crushed taconite rock. These inputs are proportional to scale of the mining operation. Materials are an important factor in the production of gross output in the iron-ore industry so they are included in the production function for gross output. The introduction of two types of materials serves to capture the fact that material's share of income is large and relatively constant in the ironore industry, which is important for the calibration strategy, rather than the end results.
By normalizing the price of f , relative to output, to 1, the above formulation is equivalent to 2 :
Labor services, l, are a function of both the number of workers, or bodies, b, and their e¤ort level, e. Speci…cally, l is described by the constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES)
; with 0 1 and 1,
where controls the elasticity of substitution, and regulates the relative importance of bodies in production. On the one hand, perhaps bodies and e¤ort are substitutes in production ( > 0). For example, take the linear case (e = 1). Here, provided that the cost is the same, the …rm would be indi¤erent between hiring b workers who expend e in e¤ort or letting each worker putting in one half the e¤ort, e=2, and hiring 2b(1 )= workers.
One the other hand, bodies and e¤ort might not be substitutable in production ( < 0).
It's easy to think of certain tasks that require more than one body. Lifting something heavy might be an example. Coordinating and housing large numbers of workers, each exerting little e¤ort, may be problematic. The appropriate value for is an empirical question; the data will be used to discipline value chosen.
The monopolist faces an inverse demand function:
Here y is the …rm's output, p is the price of output, is a demand parameter, and controls the elasticity of demand. 3 Along with union wages, w, the price of materials, q, and the rental rate on capital, r, this gives the …rm's pro…ts, :
= (w; b; e; m; k) = y 1 wb rk qm:
Since r and q are …xed in the analysis they are suppressed in the function . Also suppressed is the second form of materials, f , which is assumed to be taken into account in y. Implicitly, the price of these materials relative to the price of the output good is assumed to be one.
The Worker
Workers have preferences over wages, w, and the exertion of e¤ort e. Preferences are assumed to take the CES form shown below:
; with 1:
The parameter governs the elasticity of substitution between wages, w, and rest, 1 e.
Wages represent consumption. Rest is the total amount of energy that a worker has, 1, less the what he expends in e¤ort, e.
The Union
There is a union that negotiates on behalf of the workers. It has CES preferences over membership (or bodies), b, and worker utility in the union, U (w; e):
where captures the elasticity of substitution. It is reasonable to assume that the union cares about the utility of it's workers. Unions might care about the size of their membership, b, for various reasons. Perhaps they are egalitarian in nature and want as many people as possible to realize some common living standard. Or, perhaps it is easier to enforce a picket line with a large membership. For example, the innovation of a sit-down strike by the United Auto Workers at GM in 1936 prevented management and replacement workers from entering an Cleveland plant and resuming production.
Bargaining
In order to determine employment, e¤ort, and wages, the …rm and union engage in Nash bargaining. The surplus they are bargaining over is the amount of pro…t that the monopolist can create. Assume that the threat point for each party is shutting down operations, with the …rm stopping production or the union going on strike. Recall that pro…ts, , are given by equation (4) and union welfare, W , is given by equation (6) . Given these 
The form of this bargaining problem implies that the …rm will earn strictly positive pro…ts.
Bargaining between the …rm and the union is e¢ cient in the sense that one party cannot do better without hurting the other one. Still, from a societal perspective, things might be better without the union. First, the bargaining process exploits the fact that the …rm has market power in the iron-ore business. The …rm and union share the resulting monopoly rents. Second, the union places a value on high levels of employment in the iron-ore industry that might not be bene…cial for the economy. 4 It uses some of its rents to increase employment and lower the amount of on-the-job e¤ort required by union members.
The extra workers could be better used elsewhere and union members should put in more e¤ort on the job. 5 
The Mechanism
The main idea is that any monopoly surplus will be shared by the …rm and union. Suppose that pro…ts decrease, say as demand decreases or competition increases. This is modeled as a decrease in the demand parameter, , and an increase in the elasticity of demand, (from to 0 and to 0 , respectively). As a consequence, there are less rents to be shared between the …rm and union. How will …rm and union react? To be consistent with the data, the model must match certain trends that were observed during the crisis experienced by the iron-ore industry in the 1980s. Speci…cally, output, prices, employment, and wages must all decrease, while e¤ort and various measures of productivity should increase. The elasticities of substitution for the worker, …rm and union all play important roles in generating the desired response.
Even though the model is relatively simple, it is still not possible to obtain tractable analytical solution. So, the model will be solved numerically. Intuitively speaking, the following features help to replicate the trends in the data:
1. Bodies, b, and e¤ ort, e, are substitutes in the monopolist's production function, > 0.
Each body costs w. A prime way to reduce costs is to cut bodies. In face of the reduction in demand, this feature allows the …rm to substitute toward e¤ort and away from bodies, in order to reduce costs and mitigate the decline in rents.
2. Rest, 1 e, and wages, w, are complements in a worker's utility, < 0. In this situation, the marginal rate of substitution between rest and wages changes (in percentage terms) rapidly with a (percentage) shift in the ratio of rest to wages. To enjoy consumption the worker needs rest, so to speak, and vice versa. Thus, any required reduction in utility should be spread out relatively evenly across rest and wages. This force makes it desirable for workers to decrease their rest, 1 e, in a fairly lock-step fashion with the decline in wages, w.
3. Member's utility, U , and membership, b, are complements in the union's utility function, < 0. Here the union is unwilling to trade-o¤ a bigger decline in membership against a smaller decline in a worker's utility, or the other way around. This favors a balanced drop in membership and utility.
Calibration
The model developed will now be …t to the Canadian data. The choice of Canada over the U.S. is due to the greater availability of data, such as total factor productivity. The industries in the two countries re ‡ect each others experiences closely. There are 14 parameters to be picked, ; 0 ; r; ; q; ; ; ; ; ; ; 0 ; , and . Some are imposed and some are calibrated to the data; this is discussed below. The calibration strategy will focus on two periods in the data, pre and post crisis. The year 1981 will be taken to re ‡ect the pre-crisis era and the post-crisis era, which is taken as an average of the years from 1986 to 1990. The year 1981 is chosen as the pre-crisis year since this is when the data begins. An average of the years 1986 to 1990 is taken to help smooth out volatility in the post-crisis data. It will be assumed that the model is in a steady state for each of these periods.
As was discussed earlier, the increase in competition is modeled by a shift in the demand parameters from to from to 0 and to 0 , respectively. Speci…cally, demand will fall, as will be represented by a fall in , and simultaneously become more elastic, as measured by a rise in .
Parameters Set Exogenously
Four parameters are chosen outside of the calibration routine, namely r, q, , and . The rental rate on capital, r, is set at 10%, re ‡ecting an 8% depreciation rate in this industry together with a 2% net interest rate. The price of materials, q, is normalized to be 1, an innocuous assumption. The parameters and control the elasticity and level of demand, which are important for monopoly rents. As this is a model of imperfect competition, these two parameters govern the amount of surplus that can be generated. What is most important, however, is the change in these parameters over the course of the crisis. So, and are selected to be 0:5 and 1:0 to begin with. Then, the Canadian data will be used to determine how these demand parameters shift with the crisis, as re ‡ected by 0 and 0 .
Matching Model Moments
The remaining parameters will be picked to match moments in the model to moments in the data. For the calibration exercise, there are ten parameters to select, 0 ; ; ; ; ; ; 0 ; ;
and and there will be ten targets in the data. While all the parameters are jointly determined, what follows is a heuristic discussion of the identi…cation strategy.
The change in total factor productivity and the change in labor productivity inform on the importance of labor in the production function, , and the willingness of workers to substitute between wages and e¤ort, . The willingness of the union to substitute between worker utility and number of employees, along with the bargaining power of the union, speak to labor's share of income, and are chosen to match this statistic both before and after the crisis. The weight of materials in the production function, , and the amount of …xed materials per unit of output, , are selected to match material's share of income both before and after the crisis. The ability to substitute between bodies and e¤ort in the production function, as re ‡ected by , is set to match the change in output. The importance of bodies in the production function, , is picked to match the change in bodies. The new level of demand, 0 , is selected to match the decline in prices, while the change in change in elasticity of demand, 0 , is chosen to match the decline in wages. Material's Share (pre) 53% 53%
Material's Share (post) 58% 60% As can be seen in Table 1 , the model is able to match the facts quite well. Importantly, the model can match both the rise in labor productivity and measured TFP. 6 This is due to an increase in e¤ort by union members, which increases by a factor of …ve. while the …rm doesn't care if there are two workers, or one worker exerting twice as much e¤ort, the workers, and hence the union, will care.
Conclusion
It's reasonable believe that workers, and hence unions, care about the amount of e¤ort expended on job. In the early days, work on assembly lines was harsh. The day was long: When the surplus decreases, due to a rise in competition, the union is forced into accepting reduced sta¢ ng and increasing worker e¤ort, resulting in higher productivity. The mechanisms that allow for the model to match the data are explored. Key considerations in the analysis are: (i) the union's willingness to trade o¤ membership and the welfare of its workers; (ii) the substitutability of bodies and e¤ort in production; and (iii) the form of workers'preferences over wages and on-the-job e¤ort. The model can match both the increase in labor productivity and the rise in total factor productivity that are observed in the data.
Data Sources
Data comes from two sources. First, James A. Schmitz, generously shared the data set for his case study. Second, some data is taken from Statistics Canada. The data analysis is Schmitz (2005) is followed as much as possible, with a few exceptions. Data from Statistics
Canada is used to compute trends in pre-1980 real wage growth in the Iron Mines industry. 8 When comparing the real wage change in this time series, relative to trend, to the real wage time series, relative to trend, in Schmitz (2005) , the numbers are quite similar (changes of 20% and 25%, respectively). CPI data from Statistics Canada is used as well. The data on depreciation is from Statistics Canada. It an average of the depreciation rates in the Iron Mines industry over the time period studied.
Labor's and material's shares of income are also from James A. Schmitz's data. These series are somewhat volatile, but do not appear to have a signi…cant trend. Again, two data periods are focused on: 1981 for the pre-crisis period, and an average of [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] for the post-crisis period. The speci…c numbers here are not as important as the general magnitudes and the fact that they did not seem to change much over this time period.
